

**CHAIRMAN'S REPORT OF**  
**Track II Network of ASEAN Defence AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS (NADI)**  
**Workshop on**  
**“ASEAN Security Challenges in the Next Five Years (2023-2027)”**  
**28<sup>th</sup> – 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022**  
**via Video Teleconference**  
**Strategic Studies Center, Thailand**

1. The Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) Workshop on “ASEAN Security Challenges in the Next Five Years (2023-2027)” was organized by Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), via Zoom Meeting, from 28<sup>th</sup> – 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022.
2. Representatives from Brunei Darussalam, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Socialist Republic of Vietnam attended the Workshop. The list of participants is attached in Annex I. Major General Pratuang Piyakapho, Director of Strategic Studies Center, The National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, chaired the Workshop.

**Opening Remarks by Major General Pratuang Piyakapho, Director of Strategic Studies Center, The National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters.**

3. Major General Pratuang welcomed all participants to the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) Workshop organized via video teleconference. At the recent years, the global and regional strategic environment has rapidly changed in all dimensions, including social, technological, environmental, economic, political, and military aspects. Additionally, the new security threats have become more complex and brought concerns to many countries around the world, including ASEAN region. Furthermore, threats, such as pandemics and emerging infectious diseases, great powers competition and regional political conflicts, climate change, poverty and inequality, trade protectionism, technology disruption, supply chain disruption, and food and energy security, would even be more challenging to the ASEAN security in the next five years (2023-2027).
4. Because those security situations in the ASEAN region have affected ASEAN’s stability, it is important for ASEAN to foresee the common security challenges in the next five years (2023-2027) to prepare itself, find a relevant cooperation, and respond to challenges. Thus, the NADI Workshop on “ASEAN Security Challenges in the Next Five Years (2023-2027)” was organized to find ASEAN’s common security challenges and future scenarios for the its security in the next five years. It also aimed to provide recommendations effectively for the consideration of ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting.

### **Adoption of Agenda:**

5. The workshop adopted the agenda and the programme, which are attached in Annex II and Annex III respectively.

### **SESSION I: Keynote Speakers**

**Keynote speech on the “Prospects and Challenges to ASEAN Security” by Mr. Kavi Chongkittavorn, Bangkok Post Columnist and Senior fellow, Institute of Security and International Studies of Chulalongkorn University.**

6. ASEAN is a unique region, with diverse views and actions. It is known as “Disneyland of World Politics” because 10 member states have unique political systems. Consequently, it is not easy to manage. Furthermore, ASEAN has the world’s largest congregation of religious communities, such as Muslim, Christian, and Buddhist, within its 656-million community. However, ASEAN people have lived harmoniously and peacefully since its founding in 1967. ASEAN’s diverse views are reflected in global and regional issues. When it comes to difficult situations, ASEAN always chooses the lowest denominator or “consensus” to maintain the region’s resilience and ability to engage major powers effectively in an ASEAN way. Despite the criticism that ASEAN is weak in terms of military power, the weakness has become its strength because ASEAN attracts no enemy and it is an organization for peace and prosperity.
7. ASEAN has initiated many mechanisms, leading to regional architecture. The regionwide discussion is ASEAN Regional Forum, starting in 1991 thanks to Singapore’s suggestion. It has grown since then and deepened intersectional cooperation among 27 members across Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, East Asia Summit (EAS) is the region’s only premium strategic forum for leaders to discuss important issues and attracts many countries. Another important mechanism is ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus. Moreover, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is in the process of operationalization. Thailand proposed a new mechanism called ASEAN Plus Two Forum, the platform for ASEAN and China to discuss cooperation. Since ASEAN has convening power to have rivalries talk in a friendlier way, it can start by having working groups from China and US work with ASEAN. These group can discuss the cooperative framework, relieve the tension of China-US rivalry, and stabilize the relationship.
8. Regarding challenges, High-Level Task Force (HLTF) worked on ASEAN security issues for the next 10 years (2025-2035). It was called ASEAN Vision Beyond 2025. ASEAN’s important element to face future challenges is to maintain a common vision of unity and solidarity as a non-military bloc. Security strategies to meet future challenges must refer to BKK Declaration to initiate possible peacekeeping cooperation, such as policing. Furthermore, ASEAN should maintain balance of power between major powers. Each ASEAN member has its own style or techniques of balancing that fits its circumstances. Regarding global conflicts, ASEAN statements confirmed that the region sought peace and had humanitarian assistance available. Recently, ASEAN discussed future relations with India on Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and ASEAN outlook. ASEAN upgraded India’s strategic status to “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. In total, there are four major powers with this status, namely US, China, Australia, and India. From now on, ASEAN will have a very good relations with major powers and more countries will join many tiers of partnership.
9. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) is a crucial instrument for ASEAN to win friends and prevent wars. Currently, there are 50 signatories as of June 28, 2022. ASEAN should explore a legal binding of TAC so it can work out some form of binding. It will help the superpowers to accept ASEAN’s code of conduct, which represents collective of thinking, governance, and

rule of law. Then, it can be applied to a broader context, such as sub-regional Mekong cooperation.

**SESSION II: Presentation on the “Common Security Challenges to ASEAN in the next five years (2023-2027)”**

**Kingdom of Cambodia**

*Presentation by Colonel Suon Witu, Deputy Director of Policy and Planning Department, General Department of Policy and Foreign Affairs. Ministry of National Defence*

10. ASEAN in the next five years can potentially encounter multiple security challenges such as pandemics, geopolitical shifts, climate change, transnational security threats. Firstly, in a more interconnected world, pandemics have become a major threat to the ASEAN community as well as the world. Emerging and evolving diseases such as the COVID-19 and Monkeypox virus have and will continue to challenge ASEAN’s economy and political stability. Secondly, geopolitical shifts amongst major powers, creating a multi-polar world, will continue to influence ASEAN’s regional security and stability. It is inevitable for ASEAN to address the mutual issues of climate change. This can potentially impact environmental security within the region, such as more frequent and destructive natural disasters. Lastly, transnational security threats such as transnational crimes, terrorism, cybersecurity/artificial intelligence will remain as an important area of focus for ASEAN member states.
11. As such, it is absolutely crucial for ASEAN community to address these issues collectively through strengthening existing cooperation mechanisms. In addition, ASEAN should also focus on new areas of cooperation to effectively respond to emerging security issues related to climate change. It is vital to enhance military cooperation among ASEAN member states, so that ASEAN community can be well-prepared for future security issues posed by climate change. Finally, ASEAN should hold on to its centrality in order to effectively and appropriately respond to future geopolitical changes.

**Lao People’s Democratic Republic**

*Presentation by Lieutenant Colonel Souksan Khaiphom, Deputy of Office, Military Science and History Department, Ministry of National Defence*

12. Lieutenant Colonel Souksan Khaiphom highlighted that controversy over the political system has had a devastating effect, especially on the security. Political differences in other regions seems to be a concern of misunderstandings and it may lead to the conflict or the desire to separate an independent state, these issues may have become a challenge to the future stability of ASEAN. Moreover, the world is facing severe shortages of energy, oil and food because of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Rising oil prices are causing many countries around the world to experience sluggish economies, rising inflation and rising living costs.
13. He also emphasized Transnational crime is often carried out as a large process, and influential groups within each country are involved in. By the end, he stated that cyber challenges will inevitably be an issue for ASEAN security in the next five years, as the more technology is developed, the greater the challenges. Information hacking, especially financial and military information, cyber threats have caused a lot of damage in many countries in the region and around the world.

## **Republic of Indonesia**

*Presentation by First Admiral Joni Sudianto, M.Tr. Opsla, Director of Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Development (CSSRD) of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)*

14. First Admiral Joni Sudianto highlighted that in the next five years, the common security challenge for ASEAN, is a combination of traditional and non-traditional threats culminated in the threat of transnational crime. This can be seen from the increasing relationship between crime and terrorism, which utilize crime to support separatism and terrorism movements. The handling of this movement has been hampered by the focus of countries' priorities on traditional issues. This makes traditional and non-traditional issues difficult to separate from each other, because of these interrelationships.
15. Therefore, he recommended the following recommendations: (i) ASEAN Member States need to increase their commitment and implementation in cooperation in tackling transnational crime; (ii) AMMTC (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime) need to review the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997) mentions various crimes such as terrorism, drug smuggling, arms smuggling, money laundering, and piracy by adding (human trafficking), illegal logging, internet crime (cyber-crime), and various other international economic crimes; (iii) ASEAN Member States need to improve the management of borders, as a form of efforts to combat transnational crime that makes use of many loopholes in the border between States; (iv) ASEAN Member States need to increase cooperation in tackling transnational crime by simplifying extradition policies, and (v) ASEAN Member States need to increase cooperation in rejecting illegal goods entering their countries such as illegal mining products.

## **Malaysia**

*Presentation by Lieutenant Colonel Juma'in Saadon RMAF, Assistant Director of Defence Diplomacy Center, Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS)*

16. For the past two years, COVID-19 has impacted lives and livelihoods of millions around the world. The ongoing conflict between the Ukraine-Russia further affected our perception toward peace and stability of the world. Currently ASEAN is facing emerging security environment on a more serious scale and scope that it has never experienced before. There are three common security issues that have been identified. Firstly, uncertain big power relations refer to the United States and China and their relations with other power. Regionally, the intensifying power competition is concentrated more in Southeast Asia. Parallel to these developments is the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) by Australia, India, Japan and the US in 2017. Emergence of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) technology-sharing agreement has cause considerable various ASEAN responses. Several AMS have warned the agreement could trigger an arms race, undermine regional stability and weaken nuclear non-proliferation regimes whereas some AMS have welcomed AUKUS.
17. Secondly, complex Southeast Asian neighbourhood especially to Malaysia due to the only country that shares borders with the vast majority of Southeast Asian countries, either land or maritime. Besides territorial and sovereignty disputes, there are other bilateral issues affecting Malaysia's interests in the neighbourhood. These include: (1) conflicting interests extended from territorial disputes (2) contentious spill over from internal conflicts of neighbouring countries; and (3) refugee crises sparked by regional states' domestic issues. Thirdly, non-traditional security threats (NTS) issues involve non-state actors and trans-border crime with an asymmetric character, which have direct as well as indirect impacts to social, political, economic and environmental sectors. Common threats as nations recover from pandemic COVID-19 and reopening their borders, the threat of illegal immigration,

migration and trans-border crime is expected to increase. Another emerging common security threat is food security, maritime security and cyber security.

### **Republic of the Philippines**

*Presentation by Brigadier General Edgardo C Palma PA (MNSA), Chief, Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management (OSSSM)*

18. The discussion was divided into four parts: First is the introduction, second is the enumeration of the common security challenges, third is addressing the security challenges, and lastly is the conclusion. In the introduction, the basis of the security challenges is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which Brunei chaired in 2021 and a 304-page report on the Annual Security Outlook Report 2021 was presented. Here, 10 common security challenges were identified in no particular order, first is climate change where the region is among the hardest hit. Second is terrorism where the emergence of lone wolf terrorists and groups remains to be a major concern for ASEAN members. Third is Cyber Security where our reliance on the internet exposes us to cyberthreats individually and as a group. Fourth, HADR where the rising intensity and frequency of disasters resulted to greater economic loss. Fifth, Maritime Security where illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and armed robbery have been a challenge for the region. Sixth, Food security where the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic worsened the disruption in the region, resulting to increasing food prices. Seventh, Water Security which was driven by population growth, rapid urbanization and climate change will result in water shortage, pollution, and flooding, notwithstanding that drought is still a threat in the region. Eighth, Energy Security, which may suffer in energy deficiency by 2035. Ninth, Great Power Rivalry, where the relationship of ASEAN and the great powers such as China and the US are under pressure in a world that is changing dramatically. Lastly, Transnational crimes have been expanding and becoming more organized, thus the need to capacitate on combatting transnational crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, among others.
19. To address these common challenges, there is a need to continue and enhance the ASEAN pillars and ASEAN led mechanisms namely: the ARF, the ADMM-Plus, the East Asian Summit (EAS), and the NADI. In conclusion, the next five years may face, but not limited to ten common challenges as enumerated under the ASEAN Security Outlook Report 2021. Moreover, these challenges can be addressed by maintaining and enhancing the ASEAN led mechanisms.

### **Republic of the Philippines**

*Presentation by Jun Karlo T Laroza, Training Specialist, National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP)*

20. COVID-19 and other infectious diseases pose global security threats, and no single country's efforts will be enough to mitigate their destruction. The collective effort of ASEAN member-states would be extremely valuable in combating future non-traditional security challenges, particularly infectious diseases. While the ASEAN health sectors are responsible for a regional response to infectious diseases, AMS defence establishments can collaborate closely with other sectoral bodies and existing mechanisms to form a multi-sectoral, whole-of-ASEAN approach to infectious diseases and public health emergencies. It is necessary for ASEAN and its defence institutions to take preliminary steps today in order to prepare for a more robust response to future infectious diseases or public health emergencies.

21. It is recommended that ADMM and ADSOM support the operationalization of ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED), which will serve as a regional hub and center of excellence to strengthen ASEAN's regional capabilities to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies and emerging diseases. It is also recommended that ADMM and ADSOM promote the incorporation of pandemic response capabilities into individual AMS military for a more robust response against infectious diseases in the future. Lastly, it is recommended that ADMM and ADSOM consider information-sharing via open-source military software for AMS militaries' interoperability in detecting, monitoring, and mitigating infectious diseases. This will allow AMS militaries to collaborate on infectious disease reports, transmit real-time data, and maintain situation awareness.

### **Kingdom of Thailand**

*Presentation by Group Captain Choosak Kasatewit, Director of Regional Studies Division, Strategic Studies Center (SSC), National Defence Studies Institutes, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters*

22. Global and regional security environments become increasingly complex as a result ASEAN faces an increasingly complex strategic environment. There are three security challenges to ASEAN as follows: First, The competition between Major Powers. A rising China and attempts by the US and its allies to seek to slow down China will continue to dominate the strategic environment in Southeast Asia. The region will face an increasingly complex geopolitical situation as a result of more intense competition between the US and China in various fields, including trade, technology, and defence. Second, Climate changes. ASEAN is one of the regions that are highly vulnerable to climate impacts such as droughts, floods, storms, and sea-level rise. According to a study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), climate change has a high impact on sea-level rise in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. the Global Climate Risk Index 2021 also reported that three countries in Southeast Asia – Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand –are among the top ten countries that have suffered the greatest fatalities and economic losses because of climate-related disasters. The impact of climate change additionally poses a danger to people's lives through food insecurity, adverse health impacts, and population displacement. Third, Cyber threats continue to increase with a higher degree of interconnectedness among countries. Cyber threats have become more sophisticated and wide-spreading due to technological advancement and the growing need to rely on Internet as a daily necessity and platform for communications as well as financial transactions.
23. In order to cope with those challenges, it is recommended that: First, ASEAN should utilize the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as an inclusive set of guidelines to facilitate impartial cooperation with major powers. second, ASEAN should try to find a united approach supported by shared threat perceptions, strategic interests, and a common purpose in responding to regional challenges. Third, ASEAN defence establishments should strengthen cooperation in response to threats in the cyber domains.

### **SESSION III: Presentation on "Future Scenarios for ASEAN Security in the next five years (2023-2027)"**

#### **Brunei Darussalam**

*Presentation by Md Umair Akmal bin Hj Noor Ahsffian, Research Officer, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkuah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS), Ministry of Defence*

24. It is important to note that most security initiatives within the framework of ADMM are implemented under the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) Blueprint, which aims to "prioritise strengthening and deepening the integration process in order to realise a rules-

based, people-oriented and people-centred ASEAN Community". The previous APSC Blueprint 2015 has successfully cemented its foundation, as, in essence, it helped to deepen and expand ASEAN Political and Security cooperation with its frameworks. However, the recent Blueprint also outlines the concerns regarding initiatives and mechanisms in the sense that initiatives must have "clear objectives and be forward-looking in order to be consistent with the present Blueprint and capable of addressing existing and future security threats".

25. The lists of threats and challenges may be endless, but what important is to stock take previous initiatives and mechanisms and taking time to reflect to check if objectives and/or visions have been met. In essence, SHHBIDSS' recommends: Stock taking ASEAN-led initiatives by reassessing and prioritising relevant cooperation areas of ADMM's seven EWGs to further focus and streamline efforts of cooperation. It necessitates co-chairs of EWGs to look into creative means to improve interoperability and contribute to respond to shared security concerns.

### **Republic of Indonesia**

*Presentation by Prof. Drs. Anak Agung Banju Perwita, M.A., Ph.D., Republic of Indonesian Defense University (RIDU)*

26. The current security environment in Southeast Asia is incredibly complex, with multiple actors, issues and trends coming from within the region and outside the region. This changing security environment in Southeast Asia has led to two important challenges, those are the change from an exclusive concern on traditional security to a greater focus on human security and the change from security through armaments to security through sustainable development.
27. In order to deal with those challenges, it is more than necessary for ASEAN to prepare scenarios for the foreseeable future. First, ASEAN needs to think more systematically and comprehensively through common and shared interests, goals, and the challenges/threats to them. Second, ASEAN should assess its resources and capabilities including those that come through leveraging security cooperation in the region pertinent to common interests and regional threats. Third, ASEAN must formulate a common security strategy and review more comprehensive and integrated collaboration platforms designed to maximize common regional concerns and interests consistent with resource availability.

### **Republic of the Union of Myanmar**

*Presentation by Major General Myint Kyaw Tun, Deputy Chief of Armed Forces Training (Strategic Studies), Office of the Chief of Armed Forces Training (OCAFT), Republic of the Union of Myanmar*

28. Major General Myint Kyaw Tun mentioned that major powers are competing to shape security architectures, as well as norms and practices worldwide, including trade and investment regimes and the development and regulation of new technological infrastructures. The Indo-Pacific region is now a significant arena for competition from major powers, and major powers are increasing their presence and influence in any country in the region. He said the world is changing rapidly today, resulting in unprecedented uncertainty. In his presentation, he outlined three possible ASEAN security scenarios over the next five years: (i) the ASEAN Centrality is in danger as a result of major power rivalry; (ii) climate change is a threat to the security and stability of the region; and (iii) ASEAN is struggling to deal with cyber threats.

29. He expressed his concern about the situation of Southeast Asia that has become a hotbed of strategic rivalry between major powers since they are trying to expand their influence in the region through various efforts. He also expressed his doubt that the major powers are manipulating the ASEAN Centrality. He suggested that ASEAN should assert its role as a regional consensus-builder, and encourage building a multi-polar regional order in order to avoid undermining the value of ASEAN Centrality. He mentioned that climate change can contribute to instability, lead to displacement and migration, worsen existing conflicts and threaten global security. He suggested that ASEAN Member States should consider more effective measures to deal with the consequences of climate change. He argued that cyberthreats will be one of major challenges to ASEAN security in the next five years. He suggested that there should be greater coordination and training and exchange of views to respond to cyberthreats at the regional level.

### **Malaysia**

*Presentation by Professor Dato' Dr. Jesbil Singh, Research Fellow, National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM)*

30. Security challenges in ASEAN, both traditional and non-traditional, will not only continue over the next five years, but in some cases, are expected to increase in intensity and complexity. In the context of the traditional security domain, border and territorial disputes between the ASEAN nations will likely continue but certainly not lead to armed conflicts, finding resolutions through negotiations and peaceful means. Separatist movements will continue to be active in some ASEAN nations. Even more challenging will be the continuing territorial and maritime disputes with overlapping claims in the South China Sea, as well as the growing military build-up of islands by China. Added to this will be the growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region between China and the Western nations over China's growing economic and military power being push through various means, including the use of soft power, which could have ramifications for ASEAN. Alliances such as QUAD and AUKUS will certainly be on the radar of ASEAN.
31. In the non-traditional security domain, the challenges to ASEAN will be many and varied, and will continue over the next five years. These include sea piracy, arms smuggling, drugs trafficking, transnational crime, cyber threats and terrorism, all of which will stretch the ASEAN security organisations and limited resources, both at the national and regional level. Added to this will be the challenges brought on by climate changes such as rising sea levels, floods and storm surges, and in some cases even drought, leading to significant economic losses. The threat to the environment, as well as land and sea degradation, brought about by industrial pollution, discharge of plastics that find their way into rivers and the sea, unplanned development, open burning and the opening up of huge areas of virgin jungle for commercial cultivation, are only likely to become more serious. Action plans and initiatives undertaken by ASEAN nations at the local and regional level will still leave much to be desired. Food security, aggravated by the Ukrainian-Russian war, will be an issue of grave concern. Added to this will be energy security challenges, brought on by increasing global energy demands, inadequate output of fossil fuels and supply disruptions. So is the issue of health security brought on by infectious diseases, such as SARS and Bird Flu in the past, and now, COVID-19 and its newly evolving subvariants, that are unlikely to go away any time soon.



### **Republic of the Philippines**

*Presentation by Mr. Erick Nielson C Javier, Defense Research Officer II, National Defense College of the Philippines*

32. Mr. Javier argues that the future security environment is constantly changing and evolving, as modes of warfare that emphasize the 'indirect approach' merge with new technologies which enables the conduct of coercive actions without triggering more forceful responses from the international community. Technology-enabled threats both from states and non-state actors will characterize the scenarios of future conflict by 2027. Elements of this kind of conflict are already being observed in Russia's war in Ukraine and its exercise of cross-domain coercion against the West, and should be expected with possible flashpoints here in the Southeast Asian region.
33. ASEAN must anticipate the further deterioration of the global security environment, as ASEAN has yet to stress-test its institutions to withstand the conflicts of this scale and magnitude. ASEAN must therefore urgently implement measures to uphold its regional centrality through the enhanced evaluation and implementation of regional security agreements, as well as strengthening interoperability between ASEAN defense forces via exchanges and exercises.

### **Republic of Singapore**

*Presentation by Mr. Lawrence Anderson, Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University*

34. Mr. Lawrence Anderson provided two possible scenarios that ASEAN will face in the next five years, based on his conversations from colleagues and friends from ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue. The first scenario is one in which the United States and China are on a collision course likely to end in war. The second is the maintenance of the current status quo, which nonetheless will see the same geopolitical tensions that would still have dire consequences for ASEAN in terms of maintaining regional peace, security and prosperity. Mr. Anderson highlighted that ASEAN Member States (AMS) will face increasing pressure from the US and China to choose sides, and this would lead to greater divisions within ASEAN and greater instability in Southeast Asia. He suggested three actions for AMS to ensure that ASEAN remains resilient enough to meet these challenges and inject true substance to claims of ASEAN Centrality. First, AMS should persuade the US and China to recognise that a strong, united, and even-handed ASEAN is of better value to both of them. Second, ASEAN platforms enable leaders to meet bilaterally on the sidelines; it is crucial to receive views that might be quite different from what some leaders might hear from their trusted advisers. Third, AMS need to decide what all are prepared to do together, as well as what AMS are not prepared to do with the big powers, and agreeing on areas where AMS must stand firmly together despite intense outside pressure.
35. Mr. Anderson highlighted that NADI and the ADMM have an important role to play to ensure conflict may be averted in the region. To that end, he recommended the following: (i) ASEAN and its institutions should make all efforts to maintain ASEAN Centrality; (ii) ASEAN should emphasise its role as a bridge between the two superpowers, China and the US and their respective spheres of interests. The defence establishments of ASEAN can play this role through the conduct of defence diplomacy in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, as well as at the Track II level; and (iii) ADMM and ADMM-Plus could look at conflict prevention in areas within Southeast Asia where major power conflict is likely to blow up, particularly the South China Sea.

## **Socialist Republic of Vietnam**

*Presentation by Colonel Vu Cao Dinh, Deputy Director, Department of International Studies, Institute for Defence Strategy, Vietnamese Ministry of National Defence*

36. In the coming years, there are several risk factors for ASEAN security. First are development trends in Southeast Asia. Peace and security in the region are dependent on how ASEAN Member States (AMS) tackle both existing and emerging traditional and nontraditional security challenges. The second factor that has influence on ASEAN security is balance of power and major powers' strategies. U.S.'s effort to form coalitions to counter a rising China and other major powers' strategic adjustments will impact ASEAN centrality in the regional security architecture. ASEAN security also comes from its resilience and centrality in the regional security architecture. A resilient ASEAN will enable AMS to successfully overcome difficulties and challenges.
37. On the basis of development trends and mutual interaction between risk factors for ASEAN security, there are at least three scenarios for ASEAN security in the next five years. The most probable scenario is that a resilient and united ASEAN enables this Association to overcome challenges and successfully maintain its centrality amid difficulty. This scenario occurs when both the U.S. and China feel the need to be involved with ASEAN and ASEAN becomes more and more robust and capable of managing disputes and addressing nontraditional security challenges in the region. In the second scenario, ASEAN's resilience is greatly strengthened and major powers truly support ASEAN centrality. This most expected scenario is likely to unfold when AMS attain remarkable developments in many fields and both U.S. and China need ASEAN as an intermediary to balance and reconcile their relations and interests. The third scenario envisions an armed conflict or compromise between U.S. and China as a result of intensifying competition. Both cases have an adverse influence on ASEAN centrality.

### **Summary of Discussions:**

The meeting discussed common security challenges, both traditional and non-traditional issues, in ASEAN and future scenarios for the regional security in the next five years.

38. NADI delegates exchanged views on "Common Security Challenges to ASEAN in the next five years (2023-2027)"
- a) Great Power Rivalry**  
Participants expressed their concerns on the growing tension between China and the United States and major powers' strategies.
- b) Climate Change**  
Climate change can potentially impact environmental security within the region, such as more frequent and destructive natural disasters which may also lead to food, energy and water crisis and insecurity.
- c) Pandemics**  
Pandemics have become a major threat to the ASEAN community as well as the world. Emerging and evolving diseases, such as the COVID-19 and Monkeypox virus, have challenged and will continue to challenge ASEAN's economy and political stability.
- d) Cyber Security**  
Cyber threats continue to increase with a higher degree of interconnectedness among countries. Cyber threats have become more sophisticated and wide-spreading due to technological advancement and the growing need to rely on Internet as a daily necessity and platform for communications as well as financial transactions.

**e) Transnational Crime**

Transnational crimes have been expanding and becoming more organized, thus the need to capacitate on combatting transnational crimes, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, among others.

**f) Food security and Energy Security**

The impact of COVID-19 pandemic and Ukraine-Russia conflict disrupted Food and Energy supply chain.

**g) Water Security**

Water Security, driven by population growth, rapid urbanization and climate change, will result in water shortage, pollution and flooding, notwithstanding that drought is still a threat in the region.

**h) Border Conflict**

The traditional security domain, border and territorial disputes between the ASEAN nations will likely continue but certainly not lead to armed conflicts.

**i) Separatism and Terrorism Movements**

Interrelationships between crime and terrorism, which utilize crime to support separatism and terrorism movements. Political differences in each country seems to be a concern of misunderstandings and it may lead to border conflicts or the desire to separate an independent state,

**j) Maritime Security**

Maritime Security where illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and armed robbery have been a challenge for the region.

39. NADI delegates exchanged views on “Future Scenarios for ASEAN Security in the next five years (2023-2027)”

**Scenario 1: Conflicts and chaos in ASEAN region**

The United States and China are on a collision course that is likely to end in more serious conflict. ASEAN no longer upholds its centrality in the regional security architecture. At the same time, ASEAN will likely have to deal with one or more of the non-traditional security threats as described in the discussion above. This situation is also likely to happen in scenario 2 and 3.

**Scenario 2: Status Quo**

None of the great powers desire war in the region. However, the deterioration of the political tensions would still have dire consequences for ASEAN in terms of maintaining regional peace, security and prosperity.

**Scenario 3: A resilient, united and neutral ASEAN is able to overcome challenges and succeeds in maintaining its centrality.**

In this scenario, ASEAN’s resilience is strengthened and the major powers truly support ASEAN’s centrality. Both the U.S. and China respect ASEAN as an intermediary to reconcile their relations and interests.

**Recommendations**

1. ASEAN should address challenges collectively and holistically. AMS need to ensure ASEAN centrality is maintained when dealing with major powers. In this regard, AMS must decide what all members are prepared to do together and what they are not prepared to do with the big powers. They must stand firmly together despite intense outside pressure.
2. Facing increasing pressure from China-US rivalry, ASEAN needs to formulate common strategies and agree among member states on areas where the member states will stand together to resist the pressure from outside and maintain its centrality. AMS should persuade

the US and China to recognise that a strong, united and even-handed ASEAN is of better value to both of them.

3. ASEAN should emphasize its role as a bridge between the two superpowers and their respective spheres of interest. The defence establishments of ASEAN can play this role through the conduct of defence diplomacy in the ADMM and ADMM Plus, as well as at the Track II level.
4. Moreover, ASEAN, as a neutral institution, should work on initiatives that will promote peace, security and prosperity in the region. At the same time, it should bring superpowers to work together on ASEAN platforms.
5. To mitigate the climate change impact and build the region's resilience, ASEAN militaries must enhance their cooperation and ADMM should incorporate this issue into its cooperative mechanism. Moreover, ASEAN should enhance multilateral cooperation with external partners based on robust internal unity and centrality.
6. ASEAN can respond to challenges by building up on its success and existing framework. Open and flexible approaches are required to find a solution.
7. AMS should strengthen cooperation, coordination, training and exchange of views in response to cyberthreats at the regional level.
8. ADMM and ADSOM should support the operationalization of ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED). It will serve as a regional hub and center of excellence to strengthen ASEAN's regional capabilities to be prepared for and respond to public health emergencies and emerging diseases.
9. ASEAN Member States need to improve the border management, as a form of efforts to combat transnational crime that uses many loopholes in the border between states.
10. ASEAN Member States need to increase their commitment and deepen their cooperation in tackling transnational crime. AMMTC (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime) needs to review the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997). It mentions various crimes, such as terrorism, drug smuggling, arms smuggling, money laundering, and piracy. It also includes human trafficking, illegal logging, internet crime (cyber-crime) and various other international economic crimes.

### **Other Matters**

11. Forthcoming NADI activities

Date	Activities	Country	Via
20 - 21 July 2022	NADI Workshop: Strengthening Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Region	RSIS, Singapore	VTC
5 - 7 September 2022	NADI Workshop: Cyber Threats and Its Impacts to National and Regional Security in Southeast Asia	RIDU, Indonesia	VTC
15 - 17 November 2022	NADI Workshop: Strengthening Border Management Cooperation	CSSRD-TNI, Indonesia	VTC

### **Consideration of NADI Workshop Chairman's Report**

12. The meeting considered the draft Chairman's Report of the NADI Workshop on ASEAN Security Challenges in the Next Five Years (2023-2027). After examining the Chairman's Report carefully, the meeting endorsed the report.

13. The NADI Workshop Chairman will submit the Report to the ADSOM Chairman for consideration at the ADMM Track and a copy to the NADI Chairman.

**Concluding Remarks by Major General Pratuang Piyakapho, Director of Strategic Studies Center, The National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI), Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters.**

14. In his concluding remarks, Major General Pratuang expressed sincere appreciations to delegates and all NADI member for their dedication in participating this NADI Workshop. All contribution will be useful in supporting the ADMM in order to deal with any possible scenarios of ASEAN security Challenges in the Next Five Years (2023 – 2027).